1 These include states and regional integration organizations, such as the European Union or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Editorial: Towards a Normative Framework for Investment Law Reform
Debates about the reform of international investment law and investor-state arbitration are omnipresent. They are also at the center of interest of this 
The Need for a Debate About the Normative Foundations of Investment Law Reform
Reform debates are often reactions to interpretations of arbitral tribunals and take shape in negotiations and renegotiations of international investment agreements. The ongoing discussions on the conclusion of so-called mega-regionals, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), are most salient in this context. The aim of reform debates is often two-fold: to strike a better balance between the protection of foreign investments and competing private and public interests, both abroad and at home, and to make investment dispute settlement more transparent, predictable and acceptable to all stakeholders involved. What is more, reforming international investment law is not only on the policy agendas of future contracting parties,1 it also plays an important role for international organizations that are active in the field The reform proposals that result from these multipolar initiatives reflect and react to the political pressure international investment law is facing since its development from a little noticed area of specialized expertise into an area capable of making headline news and bringing non-governmental organizations and ordinary citizens in protest to the streets and to internet platforms.5 At the same time, the considerable number of reform proposals and diverging practical suggestions made by different institutions not only add to the complexity of the field, but risk fragmenting investment law even further. This can be counterproductive if the stated aim is to arrive at an investment law regime that is both balanced and predictable and that successfully manages to depoliticize international investment relations by providing a system that furthers the rule of law. In addition, reform proposals are themselves a reflection of underlying (conscious as well as unconscious) political and ideological preferences that may not be globally shared.
What is needed therefore is a debate about these preferences and their impact on investment law design and reform. To which extent should property be protected against adverse interferences? When should competing concerns 
Constitutional Law Approaches to Investment Law Reform
The answer to the above questions is often one of economic and social policy that may change depending on whether the wind blows more from one political ideology or another. Yet, given how quickly even fundamental economic and social policy can change -in some places from one election to the next -investment law reforms should be cast (and evaluated!) not in view of short term benefits, but on the basis of long term considerations. It is not so important whether and how investment treaties influence foreign investment flows in the short term -even if we had the right tools to measure and forecast this reliably -but rather whether they help countries to enact a framework of law and policy that is conducive to long term growth and development. Similarly, we do not need to ask whether investment treaties in a specific situation prevent or permit concrete host state conduct that is justified as being in the public interest, whether it be the way Germany phased out nuclear power or how Australia gears up against tobacco. Instead, we need to inquire more generally about the impact investment treaties have on the "rights-mix" in a global society; that is, whether and how investment law interacts with competing rights and what impact it has on policy space more generally.
It remains to be determined, however, on what basis we reach a consensus on the right "rights-mix" and balance between policy space and government control. These questions are deeply normative and require suitable consensusbuilding processes about underlying normative assumptions before comprehensive and broadly consented reform agendas in international investment law can be successful.6
My own view on ways to develop consensus on the normative foundations of investment law reform is built on an analogy between investment treaties and constitutional law.7 This analogy draws on the observation that investment law and constitutional law are functionally equivalent in guiding politics to achieve certain overarching aims and in creating spheres of freedom for the exercise of rights. These constitutional legal dimensions are present both at the domestic level and in the international context, where international law, including investment law, is used to program the behavior of states to pursue certain policies and to create rights, including for individuals. Against the background of these functional parallels, it is beneficial to explore constitutional legal arguments for guiding investment law reform in achieving an acceptable balance between private rights and public interests. In order to serve as a basis for global consensus, constitutional analysis cannot draw on specific national constitutional traditions. Instead, a broader and more comprehensive constitutional framework is necessary. Two sources of constitutional norms and values are particularly apposite: first, principles and values of comparative constitutional law and, second, multilaterally consented principles of United Nations law.
Comparative Constitutional Law
The first set of principles would originate in a comparative analysis of how domestic constitutional law, as well as other regimes of regional and global governance, envision the relationship between the state and private economic actors and circumscribe the proper role of dispute settlement institutions that review the legality of government conduct. These principles could be used not only to provide a more balanced interpretation of investment treaties (as I have suggested elsewhere),8 but also to structure a broadly recognized investment law reform agenda for the negotiation of new investment treaties. Without dwelling on the details, the fundamental constitutional principles that are broadly recognized in domestic constitutional law in a large variety of countries across all regions of the world encompass the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.9 These principles can be brought to (2014) bear on international investment law and militate for ensuring policy space, transparent procedures for dispute settlement, the protection of human rights of affected populations and foreign investors, but also a system of investment protection that ensures the accountability of host states to the concept of the rule of law.
Principles of UN Constitutional Law
The second set of constitutional principles that should inform investment law reform are principles of UN constitutional law.10 I will dwell on these a bit more in detail. These principles include: 1) international peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes;11 2) the protection of self-determination;12 3) the principle of sovereign equality;13 4) the protection of human rights;14 and 5) development and social progress.15 All of these principles are enshrined in a norm of UN constitutional law that should be placed at the center of investment law reform debates and the consensus-building processes that are needed. This norm is Art. 55 of the UN Charter, which provides:
Article 55 With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 1. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; 2. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
